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SALT II

Soviet espionage may compromise verification

LAST OCTOBER, during a visit to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) installation at Cape Canaveral, President Carter made a point of underscoring the usefulness of space satellites to the nation's security. The reference was widely seen at the time as an early salvo in Mr. Carter's campaign in behalf of Senate approval of a new strategic arms-limitation SALT II) agreement with the Soviet Union. Certainly satellites are the prime tools on which the United States must rely in insuring Soviet compliance with the terms of any new SALT accord.

The President provided his assurances at a time when observers were only beginning to assess the consequences of what must rank as the Soviet Union's espionage coup of the generation — the purchase of a top-secret, technical

manual on the KH-11 "Big Bird" satellite from a low-level employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for which the CIA man, William Kampiles, was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment in late December.

Now Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, contends that the Soviet acquisition deprives the United States of the ability to verify Soviet compliance with any agreement involving strategic weaponry.

General Graham argues further that, until they bought the KH-11 manual, they did not know the satellite had a photographic capability.

The issue is one to which President Carter clearly must address himself if he is to sell a SALT II treaty to the Senate and the country. It is also one that demands the early attention of Ohio's Sen. John H. Glenn Jr. (D), who has assumed a particular interest in the United States' capacity to assure Soviet compliance with SALT II's provisions.